Asynchronous Queue Machines with Explicit Forwarding

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SJaMtBKnN-IWe consider computational models motivated by processors which exhibit architectural asynchrony and allow operands to bypass the register bank using a forwarding mechanism. We analyse the interaction between asynchrony and forwarding, derive constraints on the usage of forwarding for various models of operation, and study consequences for compilers targeting such processors. Our approach to reasoning about processor behaviour is programming language based. We introduce an assembly language in which forwarding is explicitly visible. Operational models corresponding to processor abstractions are expressed as structural operational semantics for this language. The benefits of this approach for defining program execution and for relating processor models formally are demonstrated. Furthermore, we study the restrictions on the class of admissible programs for each operational model. Under our programming language perspective, these constraints are expressed as static semantics and formalised as type systems. Suitability of forwarding schemes for particular models of operation follows from soundness and completeness results which are established by standard programming language proof techniques. Well-typed programs are structurally correct and cannot experience run-time errors due to ill usage of the forwarding mechanism. Exposing asynchrony and forwarding to the programmer allows a compiler to optimise forwarding behaviour by scheduling operands. We show how program analysis can decide which values to communicate through registers and which ones to forward. The analysis is expressed as a dataflow problem for an intermediate language and is proven sound with respect to a dynamic semantics. Solutions to the dataflow equations yield translations into the assembly language which are functionally faithful to the operational semantics and also structure-preserving as resulting programs are well-typed. The theoretical development of the translation is complemented by a prototypical implementation. Experimental results are included for a symbolic conversion of Java virtual machine code into the intermediate language, indicating that application programs contain sufficient opportunities for forwarding to make our approach viable. In conclusion, we demonstrate the benefits of a programming language based view for reasoning about programs targeting architectures with asynchrony and forwarding

Verified Correctness and Security of mbedTLS HMAC-DRBG

We have formalized the functional specification of HMAC-DRBG (NIST 800-90A), and we have proved its cryptographic security--that its output is pseudorandom--using a hybrid game-based proof. We have also proved that the mbedTLS implementation (C program) correctly implements this functional specification. That proof composes with an existing C compiler correctness proof to guarantee, end-to-end, that the machine language program gives strong pseudorandomness. All proofs (hybrid games, C program verification, compiler, and their composition) are machine-checked in the Coq proof assistant. Our proofs are modular: the hybrid game proof holds on any implementation of HMAC-DRBG that satisfies our functional specification. Therefore, our functional specification can serve as a high-assurance reference.Comment: Appearing in CCS '1

Foundational Verification of Stateful P4 Packet Processing

P4 is a standardized programming language for the network data plane. But P4 is not just for routing anymore. As programmable switches support stateful objects, P4 programs move beyond just stateless forwarders into new stateful applications: network telemetry (heavy hitters, DDoS detection, performance monitoring), middleboxes (firewalls, NAT, load balancers, intrusion detection), and distributed services (in-network caching, lock management, conflict detection). The complexity of stateful programs and their richer specifications are beyond what existing P4 program verifiers can handle. Verifiable P4 is a new interactive verification framework for P4 that (1) allows reasoning about multi-packet properties by specifying the per-packet relation between initial and final states; (2) performs modular verification, especially providing a modular description for stateful objects; (3) is foundational, i.e., with a machine-checked soundness proof with respect to a formal operational semantics of P4_{16} (the current specification of P4) in Coq. In addition, our framework includes a proved-correct reference interpreter. We demonstrate the framework with the specification and verification of a stateful firewall that uses a sliding-window Bloom filter on a Tofino switch to block (most) unsolicited traffic

Relational Symbolic Execution

Symbolic execution is a classical program analysis technique used to show that programs satisfy or violate given specifications. In this work we generalize symbolic execution to support program analysis for relational specifications in the form of relational properties - these are properties about two runs of two programs on related inputs, or about two executions of a single program on related inputs. Relational properties are useful to formalize notions in security and privacy, and to reason about program optimizations. We design a relational symbolic execution engine, named RelSym which supports interactive refutation, as well as proving of relational properties for programs written in a language with arrays and for-like loops

Optimisation Validation

AbstractWe introduce the idea of optimisation validation, which is to formally establish that an instance of an optimising transformation indeed improves with respect to some resource measure. This is related to, but in contrast with, translation validation, which aims to establish that a particular instance of a transformation undertaken by an optimising compiler is semantics preserving. Our main setting is a program logic for a subset of Java bytecode, which is sound and complete for a resource-annotated operational semantics. The latter employs resource algebras for measuring dynamic costs such as time, space and more elaborate examples. We describe examples of optimisation validation that we have formally verified in Isabelle/HOL using the logic. We also introduce a type and effect system for measuring static costs such as code size, which is proved consistent with the operational semantics

A fast and verified software stack for secure function evaluation

We present a high-assurance software stack for secure function evaluation (SFE). Our stack consists of three components: i. a verified compiler (CircGen) that translates C programs into Boolean circuits; ii. a verified implementation of Yao’s SFE protocol based on garbled circuits and oblivious transfer; and iii. transparent application integration and communications via FRESCO, an open-source framework for secure multiparty computation (MPC). CircGen is a general purpose tool that builds on CompCert, a verified optimizing compiler for C. It can be used in arbitrary Boolean circuit-based cryptography deployments. The security of our SFE protocol implementation is formally verified using EasyCrypt, a tool-assisted framework for building high-confidence cryptographic proofs, and it leverages a new formalization of garbled circuits based on the framework of Bellare, Hoang, and Rogaway (CCS 2012). We conduct a practical evaluation of our approach, and conclude that it is competitive with state-of-the-art (unverified) approaches. Our work provides concrete evidence of the feasibility of building efficient, verified, implementations of higher-level cryptographic systems. All our development is publicly available.POCI-01-0145-FEDER-006961, FCT-PD/BD/113967/2015info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Machine-checked proofs for cryptographic standards indifferentiability of SPONGE and secure high-assurance implementations of SHA-3

We present a high-assurance and high-speed implementation of the SHA-3 hash function. Our implementation is written in the Jasmin programming language, and is formally verified for functional correctness, provable security and timing attack resistance in the EasyCrypt proof assistant. Our implementation is the first to achieve simultaneously the four desirable properties (efficiency, correctness, provable security, and side-channel protection) for a non-trivial cryptographic primitive.Concretely, our mechanized proofs show that: 1) the SHA-3 hash function is indifferentiable from a random oracle, and thus is resistant against collision, first and second preimage attacks; 2) the SHA-3 hash function is correctly implemented by a vectorized x86 implementation. Furthermore, the implementation is provably protected against timing attacks in an idealized model of timing leaks. The proofs include new EasyCrypt libraries of independent interest for programmable random oracles and modular indifferentiability proofs.This work received support from the National Institute of Standards and Technologies under agreement number 60NANB15D248.This work was partially supported by Office of Naval Research under projects N00014-12-1-0914, N00014-15-1-2750 and N00014-19-1-2292.This work was partially funded by national funds via the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) in the context of project PTDC/CCI-INF/31698/2017. Manuel Barbosa was supported by grant SFRH/BSAB/143018/2018 awarded by the FCT.This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under grant number 1801564.This work was supported in part by the FutureTPM project of the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme of the European Union, under GA number 779391.This work was supported by the ANR Scrypt project, grant number ANR-18-CE25-0014.This work was supported by the ANR TECAP project, grant number ANR-17-CE39-0004-01

A program logic for resources

AbstractWe introduce a reasoning infrastructure for proving statements about resource consumption in a fragment of the Java Virtual Machine Language (JVML). The infrastructure is based on a small hierarchy of program logics, with increasing levels of abstraction: at the top there is a type system for a high-level language that encodes resource consumption. The infrastructure is designed to be used in a proof-carrying code (PCC) scenario, where mobile programs can be equipped with formal evidence that they have predictable resource behaviour.This article focuses on the core logic in our infrastructure, a VDM-style program logic for partial correctness, which can make statements about resource consumption alongside functional behaviour. We establish some important results for this logic, including soundness and completeness with respect to a resource-aware operational semantics for the JVML. We also present a second logic built on top of the core logic, which is used to express termination; it too is shown to be sound and complete. We then outline how high-level language type systems may be connected to these logics.The entire infrastructure has been formalized in Isabelle/HOL, both to enhance the confidence in our meta-theoretical results, and to provide a prototype implementation for PCC. We give examples to show the usefulness of this approach, including proofs of resource bounds on code resulting from compiling high-level functional programs

Relational bytecode correlations

We present a calculus for tracking equality relationships between values through pairs of bytecode programs. The calculus may serve as a certification mechanism for noninterference, a well-known program property in the field of language-based security, and code transformations. Contrary to previous type systems for non-interference, no restrictions are imposed on the control flow structure of programs. Objects, static and virtual methods are included, and heap-local reasoning is supported by frame rules. In combination with polyvariance, the latter enable the modular verification of programs over heap-allocated data structures, which we illustrate by verifying and comparing different implementations of list copying. The material is based on a complete formalisation in Isabelle/HOL. Key words: Non-interference, Relational proof systems, Program transformations